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King vs. Burwell Through the Lens of Economics
Abstract
Now that Supreme Court arguments over the Affordable Care Act (ACA) are over, and the health insurance
status of millions of Americans awaits a June decision, lets take a look at some of the economics of what
a ruling for the plaintiff could mean.
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KING vs. BURWELL THROUGH THE LENS OF
ECONOMICS
Will the Supreme Court Drop an 'Adverse Selection' Bomb on 34
State Marketplaces?
By Nora V. Becker and Ari B. Friedman... | ...March, 2015 ... | ... Comment Below

N

ow that Supreme Court arguments over the Affordable Care Act (ACA) are
over, and the health insurance status of millions of Americans awaits a
June decision, lets take a look at some of the economics of what a ruling
for the plaintiff could mean.
The lawsuit seeks to deny subsidies to individuals who purchased insurance policies
in the 34 states that use the federal insurance marketplace or "exchange." While the
legal question before the court is not an economic one, to understand the effect of a
plaintiff victory, one must first
understand the structure and
economics of the health insurance
marketplaces. The Justices
implicitly acknowledged this,
referring repeatedly to a "death
spiral."
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If the Supreme Court rules for the plantiff in King vs.
Burwell, nearly 8 million lowincome people in 34
states will be denied Affordable Care Act insurance
subsidies.

A key to understanding death
spirals and similar pathologies of
health insurance markets is the
concept of "adverse selection," a
cycle of events that cause
premiums to become more
expensive.

Prior to the ACA, individuals who wished to buy insurance themselves  typically
because they were unable to obtain it from their employer or a government
program  would approach insurance companies, directly or through an insurance
broker. People with a past medical history that suggested they might have high
medical bills in the future could be refused coverage or charged a prohibitive
premium.

Contac t

The ACA created new health insurance marketplaces, or "exchanges," where
these individuals can go to one website and see many plans offered for sale,
streamlining the process and making it easier for individuals to shop for the best
plan for them. States chose whether to create their own marketplaces (statebased
marketplaces or SBMs) or allow the Federal Government to create one for them
(federallyfacilitated marketplaces or FFMs). Currently, according to the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, there are 7.5 million people receiving
subsidies in the 34 states that opted for a federal exchange.
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Key regulations
The ACA also put into place several key regulations. First, it created a mandate
that anyone who could afford to buy insurance but chose not to would have to pay
a penalty. Next, it included subsidies to ensure that insurance would actually be
affordable. Individuals for whom health insurance costs would exceed 8% of their
household income after taking the available subsidies into account are exempt
from paying the penalty if they do not purchase insurance. The subsidies apply to
people with incomes below 400% of the federal poverty limit (FPL), with greater
subsidies as incomes decline.

Researcher Kathryn
Schmitz's 'Share the
Journey' App

Third, no one could be refused coverage for a preexisting condition, a rule known
as "guaranteed issue." Last, pricing of premiums was only allowed to vary for a
population in an area (with limited exceptions
for age, smoking status, etc.), rather than the
health status of the individual buying
insurance, protecting sick and unhealthy
people from being charged extremely high
premiums. This restriction is called "community
rating."

Nora Becker is a 6thyear University of
Pennsylvania health economics
MD/PhD student interested in health
insurance, access to care, women's
health, and the impact of financial
incentives on health care utilization.

Subsidies in 34 states
The prior Supreme Court case, in 2012,
challenged the individual mandate. King vs.
Burwell, the current case, calls the legality of
these subsidies into question in 34 states.
The lawsuit charges that while the ACA
explicitly says subsidies should be made
available in states that run their own
exchange, the law was intended to deny
subsidies to enrollees in states which allowed
the Federal government to set up the
exchange.
What will happen if the Supreme Court rules
that these subsidies cannot be made
available? Two of these regulations,
subsidies and mandates, serve to decrease
the cost of insurance to consumers. That
price reduction balances out the other two
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regulations, guaranteed issue and
community rating, which tend to increase
premium prices. To understand why each of
these works in the way that they do and what
might happen if you remove one of these
regulations, we have to understand the
economic theory of adverse selection.

Ari Friedman is a 7thyear University of
Pennsylvania health economics
MD/PhD student interested in the
industrial organization of the
unscheduled care system, access to
care and insurance, and financially
integrating population health into the
medical system.

Adverse selection
Adverse selection is when sicker people are
more likely to buy insurance than healthy
people, and insurance companies are not
able to adjust their premiums to account for
the higher risk. This can happen when
people who buy insurance have more
information about their likely health costs
than insurance companies. This drives the
average healthcare costs of the insurance
plan higher, since the typical enrollee is
sicker.

Adverse selection is why an individual mandate and subsidies lower premium
costs. These two policies bring lower cost (i.e. healthier) individuals into the
marketplace. These are people who, on average, expect to have health costs
notably lower than the cost of the insurance premium, and for whom not buying
health insurance is a rational financial choice. The mandate brings these people
into the market by raising the cost of not buying insurance; subsidies bring them in
by lowering the cost of buying insurance. When these healthier people enter the
marketplaces, premium prices go down.
The other two regulations  guaranteed issue and community rating  raise
premium prices for most because they don't allow insurers to price premiums at
the individual level. For instance, for a patient with a new diagnosis of cancer,
expected health costs for a year of insurance could easily run into the hundreds of
thousands of dollars. Rather than allowing an insurance company to charge this
individual hundreds of thousands of dollars for a year of insurance, or refuse to
insure them entirely, these policies spread the cost of paying for this person's
health care across many people's premiums.
The 'death spiral'
Without a mandate and subsidies, guaranteed issue and community rating alone
quickly raise premiums, resulting in a feedback loop called a "death spiral."

A 'death spiral' destabilizes and can ultimately collapse an insurance market.
Click for larger image.

In a death spiral, prices rise so much that over time the person who last year
decided that it was barely worth purchasing an insurance contract decides this year
to forgo insurance and risk the financial burden of getting sick instead. If this
happens year after year, only the very sickest are left insured  and at very high
prices.
Complex set of effects
A ruling striking down subsidies would have a complex set of effects on the various
people right at the edge of purchasing an insurance contract. Insurance markets
do not cross state lines. Thus the people who would lose their subsidies would be
the ones living in the 34 states that chose to allow the Federal Government to
create their marketplaces.
If the subsidies are eliminated in states using the federal exchange, this could have
one of two effects on an individual who was previously eligible for a subsidy (under
400% FPL), depending on their income and the unsubsidized cost of insurance
plans available in their state's marketplace. If the cost of unsubsidized health
insurance is more than 8% of their income, they will be exempt from the individual
mandate if they choose not to buy insurance. If the cost is less than 8% of their
income, they will still be subject to the mandate and can choose to either buy an
unsubsidized plan or simply pay the penalty for going uninsured.
To make things less confusing, lets talk about four individuals. Subsidized Sally
expects to have enough health costs that it is just worth it for her to buy insurance
if subsidies remain. Intermediate Ian and Mandate Megan both are eligible for
subsidies, but have higher expected medical costs than Sally. They both think it

would be barely worth purchasing insurance without a subsidy, but only because
their expected health costs plus the price of the tax penalty for not purchasing
insurance would be greater than the cost of a health insurance premium.
Intermediate Ian has an income high enough that his premium without a subsidy
would still leave him subject to the mandate. Mandate Megan, on the other hand,
has a lower income such that her unsubsidized premium would be more than 8%
of her income. High Harry has expected health costs above Megan and Ian's, such
that he finds it worth purchasing insurance without either a subsidy or mandate at
current prices. To simplify further, none of these three will be what economists refer
to as "risk averse" individuals, in that they don't much value the financial protection
that comes from insurance and are just looking for the best deal on average.
Adverse selection at work
If King eliminates subsidies, in the first year Sally will decline to purchase
insurance. Megan will not buy insurance either, because without the subsidy she is
not subject to the mandate (her unsubsidized premium is more than 8% of her
income). Ian and Harry will both buy. Because Megan and Sally had expected
health costs lower than that year's premium, their leaving the market will cause
next year's premium to increase  that's adverse selection at work.
In the second year, Ian will now drop out because of the adverse selectiondriven
increase in the price of his insurance premium. This drives up the third year's
premium. High Harry would have purchased insurance at the initial prices even
without a subsidy or a mandate, but at some point as the death spiral progresses,
prices are too high for it to be worth it for him, and he too drops out.
Thus, one implication of adverse selection is that even if nearly everyone wants
insurance and is willing to pay more than their expected cost of medical care to
obtain it, the market will not necessarily ensure that everyone is able to purchase
insurance. Consequently, government intervention in the form of a subsidy and/or
a mandate could improve the wellbeing of society as a whole. Were that the entire
story then very little data would be required to determine how important the
mandate is to the overall health reform package. However, adverse selection does
not always exist in insurance markets. Even when it does exist, it can be small
enough that markets do not fall apart. Therefore, we have to examine the data to
see what would happen if the Supreme Court eliminates subsidies for individuals in
states with federal exchanges.
What does the most recent research tell us?
The possible effect of a lawsuit is difficult to predict because there are no past
public policy changes like this that we can study. Instead, the research in this area
uses microsimulation models of synthetic populations of individuals for whom
extensive information has been gathered about their health, families, and
economic circumstances. These models make assumptions about how individuals
will choose insurance based on the options that are available to them, and then
simulate the effects of policies by changing the available health insurance options
in the simulation.

A few studies have specifically examined the potential impact of a ruling in favor of
the plaintiffs. Specifically, they try to estimate how many people would drop
coverage in the individual market, and how much this would worsen adverse
selection in the form of raising premium costs in these marketplaces. One study,
from the RAND Corporation estimated that eliminating subsidies in federal
exchange states would result in enrollment in marketplace plans in those states
falling by 70% (9.6 million fewer enrollees), and insurance premiums increasing
between $1,610 to $5,060 per year. A second study by the Urban Institute
estimated effects of similar magnitude on premiums and insurance coverage.
Another study, also by RAND, examined the characteristics of the people who
would lose subsidies if the Supreme Court decides in favor of the plaintiffs, and
found that 99% of them would face insurance prices so high that they would be
exempt from the individual mandate. Thus, the evidence suggests that there are a
lot more Mandate Megans than Intermediate Ians in these markets.
The bottom line
The available evidence suggests that a ruling for the plaintiffs could destabilize the
individual markets in the 34 states with federallyrun marketplaces. How these
states might respond is unknown. In the event subsidies are eliminated, some
states may find workarounds. Perhaps they could legally establish an exchange
but leave the logistical responsibilities to the Federal Government, essentially
establishing a statebased marketplace "in name only." However, that would rely on
states actively seeking a workaround and such a strategy being legally viable.
Nearly 8 million subsidized individuals are currently at risk of losing subsidies. But
these numbers understate the potential impact of a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs.
Eliminating the subsidies would not just narrowly affect those who were subsidy
eligible, but also those who were not, because of the spillover effects of adverse
selection. In the absence of the subsidies, but the continued presence of
community rating and guaranteed issue, adverse selection will likely make
insurance premiums more expensive for everyone in these markets. The result
could be substantial dysfunction in the health insurance marketplaces in over half
of the states in the U.S.
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